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1. INTRODUCTION 
Hsiao and Raghavan [1] introduced a class of multichoice cooperat ive games and tbund its Shapley 
value using an axiomatic approach. Later, Nouweland et al. [2] determined the Shapley value 
~br multichoice cooperat ive games following its probabi l ist ic interpretat ion.  Howewu. the w~lues 
obta ined by these two methods are quite different. In our paper, while avoiding the problem 
of inconsistency of the Shapley value between Hsiao-Raghavan and Nouweland, we consider a 
necessary and sufficient condit ion for the Shapley vahle by Nouweland to be in the core of a 
mult ichoice cooperat ive game. 
It is well known that  in the class of cooperat ive games in ti le character ist ic function form, the 
Shapley value is in the core if the characterist ic function is either convex [3], aw~rage convex [4], 
or tota l ly  convex [5]. The latter  paper shows that  the class of tota l ly  convex games inchnles tha.t 
of average convex games. We discuss condit ions for the Shapley value to be in the core tot the 
('lass of multichoice cooperat ive games. 
2. MULT ICHOICE COOPERATIVE  GAME 
First  of all, we describe the multichoice cooperat ive game (MCG) introduced ill [1]. Let 
N -= {1, 2 , . . . ,  'n} be the set of players, M~ = {0, 1, 2 . . . .  ,m4} the set of act iv i ty levels of player 
i ¢ N.  Vv'e assume that  mi = L, L ¢ R +, for all i c N as in [1]. A coalit ion ill MCG is 
denoted by a vector s = (S l , . . . , sn ) ,  where s, ¢ Mi ,  i c N .  shows act iv i ty level of player i 
in the coal it ion s. If a player does not cooperate,  his level of act iv i ty is set at zero. Hence, 
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the coalition in which no player part icipates is specified by the zero vector 0 = (0 , . . . ,  0). We 
denote the set of all coalitions by M = M1 x ..-  x Mn. Throughout  this paper,  a coalition 
s At  = (min{sl ,  t l}, min{s2, t2} , . . . ,  min{s~, t~}) is considered as the intersection of coalitions s 
and t, and a coalition s Vt = (max{s1, t l}, max{s2, t2} , . . . ,  max{sn, tn}) is admitted as the union 
of s and t. A superaddit ive function v: M --* R 1 with v(O) = 0 is called a characteristic function of 
an MCG. It is easily seen that  v(m), m = (ml , . . . ,  ran), is the maximal  value of the characteristic 
function. We denote MCG by G(v, N). 
Consider an (m + 1) x n-dimensional payoff matr ix  ~ = (~ji) distr ibuting v(m) among all 
players and their activity levels. A component ~ji shows the increase in payoff to player i when 
he changes his activity from level j - 1 to level j .  It is said that  the payoff matr ix ~ is efficient 
if ~-~i=1 mi _ . , . , ~j£o ~ji = v(m) and it is level increase rational if ~=0 ~ji > v ( (0 , . .  0, si, 0 , .  0)), 
where i E N,  s~ E M+ An efficient and level increase rational payoff matr ix  is called imputation 
and considered as a solution of G(v, N). Let I(v, N) be the set of all imputat ions in G(v, N). 
We shall say that  the set C(v, N) {f E I(v, N) { ~ s~#o ~ - = ~'~jLO ~ji > V(S) for all s E M} is 
the core of G(v, N). 
3. TOTAL  CONVEXITY  
In [2], the following procedure of construction was proposed for the Shapley value. Suppose 
that  a given coalition s E M is formed step-by-step, start ing from the zero coalition 0 = (0 , . . . ,  0). 
On each stage of the procedure, one of the players has to increase his activity level by 1. Thus, 
the coalition s E M will be created after k(s) = ~i :~#0 si steps, i.e., each player i E N will 
reach his level of activity s~ in s. Define M + = {( i , j )  ] i E N, j  E M~ \ {0}}. An admissible order 
is a bijection w:M + --~ {1,2 , . . .  ,~-~ieNmi} satisfying w((i,j)) < w((i,j + 1)) for all i c~N and 
j E {1, 2 , . . . ,  mi - 1}. The number of the admissible orders for G(v, N) is 
- 
1-I 
iEN 
Take an arbi t rary coalition s E M and then fix a player l E N,  st ¢ 0. Suppose that  by an 
admissible order w, the given coalition s is created after the first k(s) steps, with the player l 
completing the formation of s. The number of such orders is 
a l (s )  = 
11 (si!) H ((L - si)!) 
i:(sIs~- 1)~ #0 i~N 
where s I sl - 1 = (Sl , . . . ,st- l ,s l  - 1, sl+l . . . .  ,sn). One can have that  f~l(s) = 0 if sl = 0. 
Nouweland et al. [2] showed that  ¢ = {¢j~}, where i = 1 , . . . ,  n, j = 0 , . . . ,  m,, and 
ads) 
¢¢~ = ~ a(m)  Iv(s) - v(s I si - 1)] (3.1) 
8:Si=3 
is the Shapley value of G(v, N). 
Let G s, s E M, be a subgame of the game G(v, N). Suppose that  the characteristic function v s 
o fG  s is the restriction of v to the set M s = {t E M I 0 <t i  < si for each i  E N}. Denote the 
Shapley value of G s by Cs = {¢~}, i = 1 , . . . ,  N,  j = 0 . . . .  , si. We shall say that  according to the 
Shapley value, a coalition r E M s, s E M obtains ¢(r)  = ~i:r~¢0 ~0 CJi in the game G(v, N) 
Convex Multichoice Games 97 
~-:~jL0 Cji in the subgame G ~, Now we will find a condition for 0 t,o be in and ~,s(~.) = E,:,-,#0 ' 
C(~', N). 
Introduce functions di(s) = v(s) - v(s[si - 1), s E M,  si - 1 _> O, i E N. Let t be a part icular 
coalition in M.  From (3.1), we have 
Note that  t < m, and hence, 
Thus, if 
t, i 
i:ti#O j=0 
t,  f~(s) 
: E E E 9.(m) 
i:tigiO j=0 s:si=j 
fh (s) 
= E E al. l 
i:ti¢O s:(sAt)i<tl 
- -  &(s )  (3 .2)  
- -5~(s ) .  
_ _  f~i(r) 
E E ~(,~) - ~( t )  
s:(sAt)i<_ti r:r<_t 
E E 
i:ti7£0 s:(sAt)i<_ti 
then expression (3.2) is greater than or equal to 
u, (s )  (a,(s)  - 5,(s A t)) > 0, ~(~) 
E E 
~:ti#0 r:r<t i:tiT~O j=0 r:r,=j i:ti~0 j=0 
For inequality (3.3), it is easily seen that  
E E =E E ,  
(a.3) 
(3.4) 
i:t,~O s:(sAt)i~ti sEM i:(sAt)i~t, 
with the last summat ion being zero if s A t = 0. Hence, we can conclude that  the Shapley value 
is in the core if inequality (3.3) is satisfied. 
DEFINITION. G(V, N) is called a totally convex multichoice game if for any coMition t E M,  
~(s)  (&(s)  - ~(s  A t)) > o. (3.5) 
sEM i:(sAt)~ti 
Moving backwards, from (3.4) to (3.2), we arrive at the fact that,  if the Shapley value of 
G(v, N)  lies in tile core, then G(v, N)  is total ly convex. Thus, we have proved the following 
theorem. 
TtlE()REM. A necessm 3"and sufficient condition for the Slgapley value 4) of MCG G(v, N) to be 
in the core C(v, N)  is total convexity of G(v, N).  
The proof of the theorem is also valid for the games where players may have different numbers 
of activity levels: m~ 5A mj  for i ~ j ,  where i , j  E N. 
Finally, we consider that  the definition of a total ly convex multichoice game coincides with 
another definition given by Izawa and Takahashi [5] for the class of n-person cooperative games 
in characteristic form. For the sake of simplicity, we draw on the following definition of total 
convexity proposed by Izawa and Takahashi [5]. 
DEFINITION. A cooperative game (v, N) with the set of players N = {1 , . . . ,  n} and characteristic 
flmction v is totally convex if for any subset T of N,  
Z ( ls l -  ~)~(~-ISl)! n! Iv(S) - v(S \ {i}) - v(S (~ T) + v(S ~ T \ {i})] > 0, (3.6) 
,qcN iESNT 
where the summation ~ScN is taken over all nonempty subsets S of N. 
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Note  that  game (v ,N)  is equiva lent  o the MCG G' (v ,N) ,  where Mi  = {0, 1}, i E N and 
a one- to -one  cor respondence  between M and 2 N is const ructed  as follows: s~ = 0 ¢=~ i ~ S 
and s~ = 1 ¢v i • S for each i • N .  Then  (f~i(s)/f~(m)) = (( [S [ -  1)!(n - [S ] ) ! /n ! ) ,  and 
5i(s) - &(s/x t) = v(S)  - v (S  \ {i}) - v (S  n T) + v(S  n T \ {i}), where s • M is corresponded to
S C N. Thus, (3.5) coincides with (3.6) on the class of cooperative games. 
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